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1. Introduction
In modern industrialized countries social security arrangements play a major role in
the design of the welfare state. In a general sense, social security purports to protect
workers and their families from (extreme) income losses, and will therefore enhance
economic welfare for risk averse individuals. Almost always aspects of solidarity are
inherent in the philosophy of social security. Moreover some risks (e.g. cyclical
unemployment, and more in general risks that stem from covariant shocks) cannot be
insured by private companies. That is why governments are always involved in the
provision of social security, and why it cannot be delegated (fully) to private agencies
and insurance companies.
This paper provides a review of the economic literature on social security systems and
of practical experiences with building social security institutions. The focus is on the
design of the institutions, and on the complicated relation between social security,
economic welfare and economic growth at the macro-level. Special reference is made
to the European experience, because social security systems are much more elaborate
and diverse in this continent than in the United States and Japan. The aim of this
review is to provide lessons for building social security schemes in developing
countries, and more specifically in East Asian countries, which experience a relatively
fast catch-up with the industrialized world. The caveat is that our expertise is with
social security in Europe so that we do not consider special forms of risk management
which would be typically tailored to societal structures in developing countries (see
e.g. World Bank, 2000, Chapter 8).
Three major aspects play a part in the discussions on social security: efficiency, equity
and administrative feasibility (cf. Barr (1992)). In our evaluation of European social
security systems we will focus on efficiency, but equity issues such as the reduction of
inequality or the promotion of social integration are also heavily debated by
academics and policy makers in Europe’. We do not treat administrative feasibility
because this is a rather technical issue with many legal and administrative
implications. An important component of social security systems are pension
schemes. We choose hover not tot discuss the pension system, as this topic deserves a
separate treatment.
The next section describes the main characteristics of two concepts of social security
that can be distinguished in Europe: the Beveridge concept and the Bismarck  concept.
Section 3 reviews some considerations from economic welfare theory with respect to
the working and institutional set-up of social security arrangements. Section 4 turns to
practice and addresses the experience with actual social security arrangements in
Europe, and the problems encountered when designing and implementing these social
security systems. Section 6 concludes with some relevant lessons for the design and
implementation of formal social security schemes in developing countries.
’ See Barr (1992),  section V, for a brief assessment of the distributional effects of social security in
a number of OECD countries.
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2. Beveridge versus Bismarck
In the 20th  century two concepts of social security have emerged in Europe, the
insurance concept and the redistribution concept (see Box 1 for a brief history of the
development of social security in Europe). The concepts of social security in different
countries and the content of particular social security schemes have changed over the
years, due to changes in the political and economic context and because policy makers
continue to tune the programs to economic and labor market conditions. Nevertheless,
structural differences between countries remain and distinct characteristics of the two
concepts are still visible.
The ‘insurance concept’ was introduced by Bismarck, the German leader who
introduced this type of social protection for workers in the second half of the 19th
century. During World War II the British reformer Lord Beveridge developed the
‘redistribution concept’ of social security. In Table 1 the most important
characteristics are listed. The insurance-concept focuses to insure workers against the
risk of income loss and hence it increases lifetime income smoothening. Most
programs based on this concept are financed out of premiums. Mostly joint bodies of
unions and employers administer these programs privately. Both contributions and
benefits depend on earnings. These ‘redistribution’ programs do not focus on workers
alone, but aim to cover al citizens. However, benefits are means-tested and only
provide a minimum income guarantee. Its key focus is poverty relief. Benefits are
financed out of general tax revenues and hence there is no link between contributions
and benefits. Contrary to the Bismarck concept there are little eligibility rules. Usually
public administration bodies administer the programs. In short, the differences
between the two types of programs can be characterized  as solidarity between
(insured) workers in the Bismarck concept and solidarity between citizens in the
redistribution concept.
The two stylized concepts of social security in Table 1 relate to social security
programs that aim to protect workers from different kinds of social risk, including
unemployment, disability, temporary illness, retirement and health.
Box 1 - A brief history of social security in Europe
In the evolution of European social security systems three stages can be distinguished. In
the first stage charity was the main source of social protection for the poor. In the
aftermath of the industrial revolution social insurance schemes were introduced to cover
the social risk of old age, occupational disability and illness of workers in particular
industries. Halfway the 20th century most schemes were expanded to cover
unemployment risk and coverage was extended to include al workers. After World War II
a third stage started where prevention of social risks became important and social
protection was expanded to cover almost all aspects of occupational and private life.
Influenced by Keynesian macroeconomics, social security policy became a tool for
macro-economic policy. In the 1970’s many countries introduced or extended early-
. retirement schemes in response to rising unemployment. Western European countries
differ with respect to the speed of this historic process depending on economic
development, industrialization and changing social-conditions. But by the end of the
1960s al l  countries had developed a comprehensive system of social  securi ty.
Table 1 - Characteristics of social security concepts in Europe
Pure insurance - Bismarck Pure redistribution - Beveridpe
Main goal
Eligibility
Expected
benefits
Type of benefits
Financing
Administration
Focus
Examples
Guarantee social- and economic
status
Dependent on contribution
Matches contribution
(contribution income tested)
Depend on previous wage and
contributions
Premiums
Private
Labor market
Germany
Guarantee income at subsistence
level
Independent of contribution
Means tested
Means tested, flat rate
General tax revenues
Public
Citizen’s rights
United Kingdom
In short, in the pure insurance concept of social security contributions equal the
expected benefits, both depending on the probability that the contingency takes place.
Under the pure redistribution concept eligibility depends on income and other means
of living and there is no relation with past contributions.
Connolly and Munro (1999) distinguish a third concept of social security, namely the
saving concept. Compulsory savings provide social protection for individuals, not
only for retirement pensions, but also for contingencies such as unemployment,
disability and health problems. Benefits equal the accumulated contributions and total
benefits received depend on the rate of accumulation of his compulsory savings. The
typical case is Singapore.
Social protection against the risks of income loss associated with formal employment
comprises of in-kind- and cash benefits. Because we intend to discuss the economic-
and especially labor market-related institutions of Western social security systems, we
concentrate on cash benefits2. Barr (1998) distinguished three types of cash-benefits:
I.  Social insurance: compulsory insurance with benefits levels and duration based on
past contributions and/or employment history, against a specified contingency, such
as unemployment, retirement or disability. Contributions are mostly linked to wages
and paid by employers and employees. The insurance element, or better the actuarial
element, is that benefits are partly related to past contributions. There is no means test.
II. Social assistance benefits: means-tested benefits for specified contingencies. The
benefits are mostly tax-financed, i.e. there are no premiums or other form of
contributions. The benefits are meant to be a benefit of the last resort for workers
’ See for an overview of pensions and in-kind benefits Barr (1998) chapter 9, 12, 13 and 14. Barr
(1992) provides a clear and thorough review of the empirical and theoretical literature of the economics
of health care.
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without (sufficient) unemployment insurance, for households with no source of
income or for the working poor. Usually the benefit duration is unlimited.
Ill Universal benejk  tax-financed benefits awarded on the basis of specified
contingencies without a contribution or means test, such as child benefits and the flat
rate retirement pensions in some countries (e.g. Sweden and The Netherlands), the
National Health Service in the United Kingdom and family support or child benefits
in many other European countries.
In Table 2 we illustrate the distinction between the two types of social security
benefits. On the basis of the description of the two systems given in Table 1, we
expect that in countries with a social security system that is dominated by the
insurance concept, a large proportion of the revenues are paid by employees and other
insured persons. The state is likely to be the major source of revenue in countries
where social security is dominated by the redistribution concept. We expect these
countries to spend a relatively large portion of revenues on social assistance and
family allowances and a relatively small portion on social insurance. In countries
where social security is characterized  by the insurance concept we expect a reverse
pattern.
From Table 2 we conclude that social security in Germany and, to a lesser extent, The
Netherlands is dominated by the insurance principle. Social security in England and to
a lesser extent Sweden and Denmark is dominated by the redistribution principle.
Generally speaking, there is a trade off between the insurance- and the redistribution
system: the former provides relatively high benefits for a limited group; the later
grants relatively low benefits for a large group. Overall spending, as a percentage of
gross domestic product, does not differ much however.
In most European countries there is a two-layer system to protect workers against the
consequences of unemployment. After an initial period of receiving unemployment
insurance benefits unemployed workers are entitled to means-tested assistance
benefits. In most countries there is a general social assistance scheme, but Germany,
France and Spain have a special means-tested unemployment assistance program. The
Netherlands abandoned the special means-tested unemployment assistance program in
1996, and introduced a general social assistance scheme. The difference between the
social assistance scheme for unemployed workers and for persons without
employment history usually relates to the type of means-testing, which is typically
less tight for the unemployment assistance benefits.
.
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Table 2 - Characteristics of social security systems: sources of revenue and type
of benefits
Sources of revenuea Spending by type of benefitd
Germany
1960
1970
1980
1985
1993
1995’
Netherlands
1960
1970
1980
1985
1990
1993
France
1960
1970
1980
1985
1990’
Denmark
1960
1970
1980
1985
1990
1995’
Sweden
1960
1970
1980
1985
1991
1993
Insured
Persons
Employers Stateb Social Social Family
insuranceC assistance allowance
25.9 44.4 25.0
28.9 42.3 25.1
34.0 34.2 28.9
36.3 34.7 26.4
36.8 32.3 27.6
29.8 38.1 29.8
66.7 6.6 2.0
70.8 4.7 2.6
75.4 4.1 5.0
78.3 4.9 3.3
81.7 6.4 2.6
40.9 40.3 12.2 64.4 4.8 13.0
38.5 42.9 12.3 69.4 4.8 10.3
33.2 33.3 24.6 73.7 6.2 7.5
39.5 31.8 16.3 76.5 3.5 7.2
43.0 17.7 24.4 77.4 2.7 5.1
46.0 18.0 21.4 77.5 2.2 4.8
18.9 68.9 11.1
18.9 68.4 10.3
21.0 53.4 24.1
23.0 50.3 23.7
62.6 15.8 10.6
65.7 13.2 11.2
71.9 4.6 11.9
14.; 8.9 75.8
1.8 5.9 90.2
3.1 7.8 86.1
4.6 5.1 87.8
10.8 9.5 73.7
69.4 18.5 6.6
68.3 24.2 3.0
68.2 25.7 1.8
62.6 28.6 3.3
20.5 11.0 66.9 71.3 12.2 10.7
11.4 27.7 54.6 80.2 14.7 5.1
1.0 45.9 45.3 77.9 16.8 5.2
1.3 36.4 52.2 84.5 0.3 15.3
1.7 39.7 49.4 84.2 0.6 12.9
1.0 43.0 56.1 83.8 1.5 12.8
Table 2 (continued) - Characteristics of social security systems: sources of
revenue and type of benefits
Sources of revenuea Spending by type of benefitd
Insured Employers Stateb Social Social Family
Persons insuranceC assistance allowance
United Kingdom”
1959-60 20.0 1 7 . 9 58.7 71.0 10.8 5.4
1969-70 1 9 . 9 24.9 53.0 70.5 15.0 5.4
1979-80 15.6 26.2 55.0 67.3 1 5 . 6 7.8
1984-85 1 8 . 3 23.5 55.5 58.8 24.5 7.0
1991-92 1 5 . 6 25.5 49.8 61.1 22.8 5.7
1993-94 14.0 22.8 54.7 57.8 26.2 5.6
Source: Website  at www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/socsec,  International Labor  Office  (1992),  Barr (1992)
and own calculations.
Notes:
a Including social  security related to:  medical  care,  sickness benefits ,  unemployment insurance,  ret irement
pensions, employment injury benefits, family benefits, maternity benefits, invalidity benefits, survivors’ benefits.
Total sources do not add up to hundred percent because revenues from capital income and other sources have been
omitted.
b Including special taxes allocated tot social security and participation of other public authorities.
’ Including public health services.
d Total  spending by type of benefi t  does not  add up to hundred percent  because spending on benefi ts  for  pubic
employees and war victims has been omitted.
e The reference period is April - March.
f Change in the definition.
. indicates that no consistent or reliable data was available.
The three types of cash-benefits mentioned are theoretical constructs. All European
systems of social security consist of a combination of these three types of cash
benefits, but one type or the other may dominate in a country. In practice many
programs combine elements of unemployment insurance and unemployment
assistance. For example, the level of the Germany unemployment assistance benefit
depends on previous earnings and the British unemployment insurance scheme
provides a flat-rate benefit, although entitlement depends on contributions.
Germany comes closest to the pure insurance system. The unemployment insurance
programs in other countries deviate in three ways (Schmidt and Reissert (1996b)):
1. In The Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden the government contributes from the
general budget to the unemployment insurance fund.
2. In the United Kingdom the social-insurance system as a whole receives a cross-
subsidy from the unemployment insurance fund.
3. In Denmark and Sweden contributions are flat rate although benefits are income-
related.
The United Kingdom represents the opposite of the German system, and comes
closest to a pure redistributive system.
.
It is important to note that one has to be very cautious in classifying countries into
concepts as general as the ‘insurance’ and ‘redistribution’ concept. Nevertheless, the
classification of social security systems given in this paragraph turns out to be
remarkably stable over time. In fact, many countries have sharpened their respective
profiles (Schmid  and Reissert (1996b)). In recent years the social security system in
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the United Kingdom moved even further away from the insurance principle. Since
1992 unemployment insurance contributions are related to past earnings, although the
program pays a flat-rate benefit. In Germany, France and Spain the link between
benefits and previous employment and contributions has been strengthened.
At present, the theoretical concepts of ‘pure redistribution’ and ‘pure insurance’ have
evolved into a complex and highly diversified system of social security programs. In
practice most Western European countries have components of both concepts, and all
European countries have come to face to some extent the trade-offs and choices
discussed in the next section
3. Theoretical considerations
Eficiency  and Equity
Amongst academic economists there is no consensus on the question whether a
comprehensive system of social security constitutes an impediment for economic
performance or whether it, on the contrary, enhances economic activity (see e.g.
Borstlap, 1996). An underlying question in this debate is whether the reduction in
inequality, which results from redistribution in a system of social security, is harmful or
beneficial to economic growth. The argument which stresses the negative impact of the
redistribution effect of social security on economic activity is Okun’s well known
argument on the trade-off between equity and efficiency. According to this argument
social security expenditures are thrown in a leaky bucket because the welfare loss of
those who pay the social security premiums is larger than the welfare gain of those who
benefit from social security.
On the other hand is argued that social security provisions may enhance economic
welfare. There is a parallel between this argument on the beneficial effects of social
security and the findings of, among others, Persson and Tabellini (1994),  who
observed that on the basis of the results of the democratic correction mechanism
inequality is harmful to economic growth. As the recent literature (see Aghion, Caroli
and Garcia-Peiialosa, 1999) suggests that the relationship between inequality, poverty
and economic growth is quite complicated and that no unequivocal conclusion can be
drawn, we will not pursue this question further. We concentrate on the relationship
between the redistribution effects of social security and economic welfare, where we
implicitly assume that social security will alleviate poverty and enhance equality.
According to those who argue that social security has a positive effect on welfare,
Okun’s metaphor of the leaky bucket is incorrect because it assumes that we live in a
perfect world with complete information and with well-functioning markets.
However, the real world is not perfect and in our “second best world” the
redistribution of social security may very well enhance economic welfare. In
particular the so called irrigation function of social security is put forward as an
alternative to the leaky bucket of Okun. According to this theory a positive
‘relationship between social security provisions and economic performance can exist
because the lack of social security may be an impediment for the functioning of labor
market dynamics. These labor market dynamics where, due to idiosyncratic shocks,
old jobs are destroyed and new jobs are created, play an essential role in economic
development. It would be harmful to economic activity when the process of structural
change which brings about job creation and job destruction, was hindered by
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impediments resulting from the labor market. In case workers can resort to the social
security provisions, they will not be too reluctant to give up the old job when it has
become unproductive. Instead they will be more eager to search for a new job with the
expectation that the search process results in a good match between their own
capabilities and the requirements for a new job, so that the match becomes as valuable
and productive as possible.
At the macro level it implies that the processes of job destruction and job creation,
and hence of structural change, can proceed in good pace. In the end this is beneficial
to productivity and therefore to economic welfare. Temporary unemployment, or
frictional unemployment, is inevitable in this process. It is a necessary condition for
welfare increase, resulting from structural change initiated by technological progress
and shifts in preferences. We note that this irrigation function of social security
provides a further argument for setting up comprehensive social security systems in
newly developing countries that, due to the technological catch-up with the
industrialized world, witness a fast economic growth. Especially in these countries it
is important that workers can spend time to search for good jobs and establish good
matches. It would be a severe impediment to the functioning of the labor market when
there were no good social security provisions and job seekers had to spend a lot of
time to earn a living just at the subsistence level, e.g. by working in the informal
sector.
How can social security enhance welfare?
The mechanisms according to which a comprehensive social security system may
enhance economic welfare are illustrated in formal modeling exercises by Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999) and by Marimon and Zilibotti (1999). The upshot of both
articles is that the rather limited extent of social security provisions in the United
States as compared to the extensive provisions in Europe resulted in less
unemployment in the United States than in Europe, but that, on the other hand, the
European social security systems are more beneficial to economic welfare. The
equilibrium search theory of the labor market is at the core of the argumentations in
both articles. The most important sources of the differences are the skill biused
technology shocks. These shocks imply that the spread and heterogeneity in the
demand for capacibilities and skills at the labor market becomes larger so that
differences in education become more prominent in the search process (see e.g.
Machin  en Van Reenen, 1998, and Berman, Bound and Machin,  1998, for empirical
investigations of the importance of these shocks). The effects of skill biased
technology shocks are different in countries with an extensive social security system
as compared to countries with limited social security. The focal point in the reasoning
is again that unemployed in a country with extensive social security spend more time
searching for a job which fully matches their skills than unemployed in countries with
little social security. An abundant social security system makes both employers and
employees more choosy in establishing a good match. This mechanism gains
importance when the heterogeneity in the demand for skills increases and leads to
longer unemployment spells when social security is good. This explains why
unemployment is larger in Europe than in the United States. But the advantage of the
European situation as compared to countries with poor social security is that quality of
matches increases and that in successful matches workers’ skills are exploited in a
better way so that productivity is higher. This is also favorable for job creation as the
asset value of a successful match becomes larger.
The formal models in both articles differ in the sense that Mortensen and Pissarides
consider a completely segmented labor market with two different levels of education,
whereas Marimon and Zilibotti allow at the same labor market all possible matches
between heterogeneous jobs and workers with different skills. Yet the mechanisms in
both models and their effects on unemployment and welfare are not essentially
different. Calibrated versions of the models with realistic parameter values appear to
be very well capable in explaining the differences in actual labor market
developments between the United States and Europe. Mortensen and Pissarides show
that, if the United States would have had the same level of unemployment benefits
and the same level of protection against dismissal as Europe, skill biased technology
shocks would have had similar effects on unemployment and on wage differentiation
as in Europe. According to the modeling exercises of Marimon and Zilibotti a good
system of social security enhances unemployment duration but it also leads to a
considerable increase in productivity because of better matches when skill biased
technology shocks hit the economy. Moreover, the model of Marimon and Zilibotti
shows that not only unemployed experience a welfare gain in a country with extensive
social security, but that such social security also enhances the welfare of low paid
workers. On the other hand, a good social security system is a disadvantage for those
lucky workers who already earned a high salary due to a good match. It should be
noted that both models do not reckon with risk averse behavior, which is another
argument why a good system of social security enhances welfare. Yet an important
disadvantage of both models is that they it do not allow for job mobility so that these
models assume that only unemployed and not employed workers search for new jobs.
Although both models relate to differences between social security systems in the
industrialized world, the arguments why a good social security system may enhance
productivity and welfare, will certainly also apply to developing countries with fast
economic development and structural change.
Trade-ofss  in institutional arrangements
The traditional aims of social security are to protect people from the financial
consequences of unemployment, disability, retirement and other social risks.
Additionally the social security system aims to prevent these contingencies and if
possible to restore the old situation, i.e. to reintegrate workers in the labor market.
Proposals to reform or implement social security programs should be assessed
according to these two main goals. For such assessment it useful to consider a simple
framework to assess policy proposals for social security, which consists of assessment
criteria for coverage, entitlement rules (the ‘gate keeper’ function) and reintegration
(c.f. Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), 2000 and Den Butter and
Kock,  2000).
The first criterion relates to the coverage and scope of a particular social security
program or reform proposal. The key question here is who is entitled to the benefit. In
policy discussions this issue is often addressed as a trade-off between general and
targeted policies. The advantage of targeted policies is that they directly address the
social risk of a narrowly defined group. A disadvantage is that people, who a priori do
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not belong to the target group, have an incentive to adjust their behavior to become
entitled to the benefit. The Earned Income Tax Credit is an example of a targeted (tax)
policy, aimed to increase labor supply of low wage workers. The disincentive
involved in this policy is that the high marginal tax rates in the phase out range of the
tax credit give workers disincentives to invest in human capital. Furthermore the
relative prices of labor are distorted. General policies do not face these problems
because their-scope is much wider, which reduces the incentives to change behavior in
order to become entitled to the benefit. General policies however, suffer from a large
deadweight loss: a large number of recipients, which are formally entitled to the
benefit, does in practice not need the benefit. A good example is the general tax credit
introduced in the Dutch tax reform, which will become effective in 2001. The tax
credit aims to increase labor supply and the outflow from unemployment. This policy
measure does not generate labor market distortions, but given the government’s
budget constraint, the level of the tax credit and the impact on labor supply and
unemployment outflow will only be limited.
Once the coverage and corresponding entitlement criteria of a social security program
have been determined, one has to consider how these criteria are going to be enforced.
Applications have to be evaluated and entitlement decisions have to be taken. This
gatekeeper-function determines who will be granted a particular benefit and what the
benefit level and duration will be. Generally speaking, the gatekeeper function is more
important for targeted policies because these programs give people incentives to
change their behavior and apply for a benefit, although their personal characteristics
have not changed. The gatekeeper function always involves societal costs. A severe
application of the rules determining who is entitled for the social security provision,
and who is not, implies that only a small chance remains that somebody is admitted
who is not entitled. This is analogous to the error of the second kind in statistical
testing. On the other hand, the error of the first kind - the probability that somebody
who is entitled is not admitted -, is rather large with severe gate keeping. The
opposite holds for a generous application of admission rules. Now the probability of
an error of the first kind is low but the probability of an error of the second kind is
large. One can try to enhance the discriminatory power of the gatekeeper function by
reducing the asymmetric information between the gatekeeper and the individual who
seeks entitlement, but that will seriously enlarge the costs of gate keeping.
The first two criteria in asserting social security reform policies relate to the inflow in
the program. Outflow or reintegration is evaluated with the third criteria. Social
security programs for unemployed-, disabled- and ill workers should contribute to
rapid reintegration in the labor market. This can be done in many ways, for example
by integrating active labor market policies in the benefit program. Obviously the
incentive structure of a particular benefit program is an important aspect in the
outflow rate of the program.
Incentives
If properly designed, benefit programs minimize adverse labor supply effects.
However, many social security programs in Europe cause severe incentive problems
on the labor market. The magnitude and the precise form of these incentive problems
depend on the institutional characteristics of a social security scheme. For
1 0
unemployment compensation programs (i.e. unemployment insurance and
unemployment assistance) these characteristics are:
1 .
2 .
3 .
4 .
5 .
6 .
7 .
8 .
Benefit level;
Benefit duration;
Contributions (taxes or premiums);
Entitlement conditions (lay off, not voluntary quits, employment history);
Job search conditions;
Job acceptance conditions (some ‘unsuitable’ job offers may be rejected);
Means-test (including other household incomes?, including housing property?);
Household circumstances (children?)
The traditional negative incentive effect is that higher benefit levels or longer benefit
duration tend to increase the reservation wage and lower the job acceptance
probability of a worker and hence lower the outflow rate of unemployment. Because
of high replacement rates (i.e. the ratio of the net benefit level to the average net
wage) the price of unemployment is lower to the unemployed and they may be less
willing the search for jobs or accept a job offered. Moreover, if consumption and
leisure are complements, then an increase in the benefit level will increase the value
of leisure and the worker will reduce his search intensity, which influences the
outflow rate from unemployment negatively3.
High benefit levels cause a disincentive for workers to accept low paid jobs, because
their net gain in income will be small. In many European countries this problem is
increased due to means-tested additional benefits, which are sometimes in-kind. In
many countries, such as Germany, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands,
unemployed workers receiving unemployment assistance are exempted from local
taxes and they are entitled to discounts for some education and health services. In
some countries the rent allowance is linked to the unemployment assistance benefit. If
these unemployed workers accept a job, they will loose most of these additional
benefits and discounts. This creates the so called ‘unemployment trap’, by which
workers remain unemployed voluntarily because of the small net gain they can get
accepting a job.
On the other hand, unemployed workers who are not entitled to unemployment
insurance benefits will lower their reservation rate and raise their search intensity
when unemployment benefits become more generous, to find employment and hence
qualify for unemployment benefits. The magnitude of this entitlement efSect  of
unemployment insurance depends on the precise form of the entitlement conditions.
The incentive effects of unemployment compensation relate to whether a country’s
social security system is mainly insurance-based or redistribution-based (cf. Schmid
and Reissert, 1996b). Insurance-based social security systems, such as Germany, tend
to exclude long-term unemployed from unemployment insurance. Because these
unemployed workers usually receive a means-tested unemployment assistance benefit
or family allowance, the unemployment trap applies in particular to them.
3 See Kami (1999) for an overview of the theoretical literature on optimal unemployment insurance.
1 1
The unemployment insurance benefit level is considerably higher than the
unemployment assistance benefit level. The latter is mostly a flat-rate means-tested
benefit, whereas the former usually depends on the previous wage of the worker. In
countries such as Germany, The Netherlands and France, unemployed workers who
reach the end of the maximum period of unemployment insurance benefits move to
the stock of unemployment assistance beneficiaries, and face a sharp decline in
benefit level.- They are induced to lower their reservation wage and increase their job
search activities, which will raise the outflow rate from unemployment. Empirical
studies found a large increase in the outflow rate of unemployed towards the
exhaustion of the benefit period (Van den Berg, 1990).
The general conclusion from the empirical literature is that the duration of
unemployment is slightly longer at higher replacement rates @yard,  Nickel1 and
Jackman,  1991). For The Netherlands Van den Berg (1990),  Kalb et al. (1991) and
Muffels (1993) found duration-elasticities with respect to the benefit level or
replacement ratio in the range 0.06 to 0.47, the lower value applying to high skilled
workers and the higher value applying to low skilled workers after two years of
unemployment. For the first two years of unemployment Van den Berg found an
elasticity of 0.14 for low skilled workers. These results are illustrative for other
European countries. One reason why most empirical studies indicate only a small
effect of the unemployment insurance benefit level on unemployment duration is that
occasionally counteracting policies have been introduced. For example, in the late
1960s and early 1970s unemployment compensation was extended in Sweden, while
active labor market policies were introduced to combat raises unemployment.
Bjiirklund  and Holmlund (1989) conjecture that this is a reason why they find only a
limited impact of higher benefit levels and benefit duration on unemployment.
4. Practical experiences
Spiral of the wedge and the supply efect
Social security influences the development and pattern of labor force participation
over time, the tax- and premium rates and the labor productivity (see Van Paridon,
2000). The interaction of these macro-economic variables could cause a negative
spiral. High taxes and premiums, needed to support an abundant system of social
security affect both labor supply and labor demand. High average and marginal tax
and premium rates create a wedge between the gross and net wage of workers. This
will induce a decline in labor force participation and the number of hours worked,
especially for women earning a second family income. Low labor force participation
in turn, provides a small base to finance the social security programs. In a downturn of
the business cycle, a relatively large premium and tax raise will be needed which
induces unions to demand higher wages. This reduces labor demand, deteriorating the
premium and tax base even further. This mechanism, which is sometimes referred to
>s the social security trq, is reinforced because high wage costs give employers an
incentive to increase labor productivity through investments in laborsaving
technology and innovations.
A major engine behind this mechanism of a negative spiral is that social security is
not only determined by demand, but also partly by supply. Den Butter (1993)
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investigates such a ‘supply effect’ by means of a cliometric model simulation over the
period 1970-1990 in The Netherlands. This period witnessed a sharp rise in the
number of persons who received (or made themselves receive) benefits, in spite of the
fact that the system of social security, which was mainly built up in The Netherlands
in the 1950s and 196Os,  was not expanded with major new provisions in the 1970s
and 1980s.
In order to illustrate how a negative spiral of the wedge can be set in motion we discuss
the supply behavior in the model. The model describes a breakdown of the total
working age population into three categories, namely the participants (active workers4),
non-participants receiving a benefit, and finally non-participants who do not receive a
benefit. The model assumes that the allocation of the working age population to the
three categories is determined by labor supply behavior. Each individual of the working
age population has the discrete choice to be in one of the three states:
s,: Active worker
s*: Recipient of benefits
S$ Non-participant without benefits
Each state is associated with a certain amount of utility which is partly a function of
monetary rewards and monetary costs (including opportunity costs) and which partly
relates to immaterial aspects of being in that state, such as social status.
The utility of being an active worker firstly depends, as in textbook labor supply
models, on net earned wages, wn. Secondly there are costs involved in finding and
holding a job, which are dependent upon the ease with which jobs can be obtained and
hence upon labor demand. Therefore two determinants of labor demand enter into the
utility function, namely gross real labor cost per worker in the market sector, corrected
for labor productivity, wgl, and economic activity corrected for labor saving technical
progress and contractual working hours, yu,
Wl)  = fl wl, wg’, yLd,  Ul>
Finally there is a (dis)utility  Ui connected with being an active worker, which on the
one hand can be associated with foregone leisure time, but on the other hand also with
opportunities for social contacts, for maintenance and upgrading of human capital
(‘learning by doing’) or for future eligibility for social security (the entitlement effect
mentioned before).
The utility of being a recipient of a benefit is assumed to be a function of the replace-
ment ratio, rr, (the ratio of net benefits and net earned wages), the ease with which
social security benefits can be obtained, SSC, and the (dis)utility  of receiving a benefit,
u2,
a
WS2)  = f2 (n,  ssc,  U2)
4 In the international literature (gross) labor participation is usually defined as employment
plus unemployment, but here we will stick to the terminology in The Netherlands which
identifies (net) participation with active workers (total employment minus temporary illness).
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The replacement ratio as an argument in this utility function is in accordance with labor
supply models in the literature. The benefit level may also act as an argument in the
utility function for the active workers representing the reservation wage. The second
argument, the ease (or costs) of obtaining a benefit, relates to the main determinant of
the supply effect. This argument represents the crucial feature of the model, namely that
the number of people obtaining a social security benefit does not solely depend upon
the underlying determinants of demand, but also upon supply.
A first aspect with regard to this argument (SSC) representing the supply effect is the
moral hazard problem with social security. Lubbers (1990) mentions the erosion of the
sense of responsibility when applying for social security. On the other hand, the supply
effect comprises the fact that people will become aware of their legal right to demand
social security in case they have become eligible. Therefore, part of the supply effect
will involve that more and more people eligible for social security actually receive
benefits. One could also speak of a kind of increased ‘rent seeking’, which is yet
another aspect of the supply effect. Whereas the benefit level as an instrument of the
government represents so-called price policies in social security, the various
possibilities of the government to influence the supply of social security can be
regarded as examples of volume policies. A decrease of the supply effect can be brought
about by strengthening the standards of eligibility for social security or by a more
severe gate keeping function. Another way to effectuate such decrease is to call for the
responsibility of the people not to abuse social security, and to provide training and the
opportunity to obtain working experience rather than just giving financial compensation
(workfare instead of welfare).
The (dis)utility  of receiving a benefit, U2,  is taken as a separate argument in the utility
function above, but of course this (dis)utility  is strongly connected with the social
climate.
Finally we have to consider the individual of the working age population who decides
to be non-participant without benefit. As this is the residual state we have
W3)  =  f3 W3)
with Us  the (dis)utility  of being in state Ss. This (dis)utility  depends upon the value of
leisure time and upon the reciprocal of all arguments raised in the discussion on the
utility of being in states St and S2.  Now each individual, who can potentially supply
labor,  is faced with the following simple discrete choice problem:
ma { Wd,  W2h  US31  1 j=l,2,3
%
The solution and empirical implementation of this discrete choice problem gives an
impression of how the supply effect translates into a higher demand for social security
‘and less labor participation. When the supply effect increases, e.g. because the social
security system becomes more generous or through learning effects, the negative
spiral of the wedge is set in motion. Higher demand for social security causes a rise in
premiums and taxes which widens the wedge between gross labor costs and net
earnings. This leads to a fall in labor participation both through the demand and
supply side of the labor market, and hence to a further increase in the demand for
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social security. Therefore the indirect effect of the supply effect on labor participation
is much higher than the direct effect. This illustrates the importance of curbing the
negative spiral by institutional changes which reduce the supply effect in size. The
description above of the main determinants of the supply effect indicates which policy
options for such institutional changes can be successful.. For developing countries
which are building up a system of social security it is essential that they prevent,
through a proper design of institutional arrangements, that labor supply behavior
induces a negative spiral.
To our knowledge, no comprehensive, comparative country-studies are available
about this issue, but Table 3 provides some indicators relevant in this discussion.
Table 3 - The supply effect of social security: labor  participation, social security
expenditures and productivity (1993) and wage costs elasticities
Participati Social Taxes and GDP per GDP per Wage costs elasticities
on rate security premiums worker hour with respect to social
(labor expenditure (as a (index, worked security contributions
years) (as a percentage USA = (index,
percentage of GDP) 1w USA =
Employers Income
of GDP) low
contribu- taxes and
tions workers
contribu-
tions
Netherlands 5  1 2 7 5 5 9 0 1 0 6
France 5 6 2 4 4 7 9 4 9 7 0.4d 0.4d
U K 6 0 1 6 4 6 7 5 8 0 0.25 0.25
Germany 6 2 15 3 7 8 2 8 4 1 . 0 1 . 0
U S A 6 5 1 3 3 2 1 0 0 100 0.0 1 . 0
Japan 6 7 1 2 3 3 7 5 6 3
Source: OECD (1994 and 1995) and Van Paridon (2000).
Taking the United States as a benchmark Japan has high labor participation, low
social security expenses and tax- and premium rates combined with a low productivity
level. In The Netherlands and France, and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom
and Germany, labor participation is low and social security expenditure and income
and the productivity level are high.
Time lags in the economic impact of social security
A major problem of the social security system is that it is turns out to be difficult to
adjust to changing social patterns. The impact of a system of social security depends
on the circumstances in other parts of the economy and society. A generous system of
social security may go together with economic growth, low unemployment and high
‘labor force participation, but if in the long run the macro-economic, social or
technological environment changes, the same system could seriously frustrate
economic development.
Recently a number of authors stressed that high and persistent unemployment in
Europe is caused by a generous system of social security, reducing work and job
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search incentives in combination with increased economic turbulence, caused by
technological change and increased competition. In the 1950s and 196Os,  when most
social security programs were developed and structural change and labor market
dynamics were more modest, these problems were not foreseen.
Bertola and Ichino  (1995) interpret economic turbulence as reflecting more volatile
local demand shocks. Given that wages are rigid in the short run and firing costs are
high in Europe, a higher probability of negative shocks decreased labor demand, i.e.
the causality goes via the demand side of the labor market. In contrast Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998) explain high and persistent unemployment in Europe via the supply
side of the labor market. In their model workers lose skills at displacement and while
unemployed. This loss is due to structural changes, e.g. the transition from a
manufacturing to a service economy, globalization of the economy and adoption of
information and communication technologies (ICT). In combination with high
replacement rates, which set high reservation wages, this causes long-term
unemployment because reservation wages are high relative to the low productivity. In
addition the low job finding probability and high replacement rates cause low search
intensity which, in turn, causes a high rate of long-term unemployment. The low job
finding probability is due to the depreciated level of human capital due to
displacement subsequent unemployment. The model by Marimon and Zilibotti (1999),
which we discussed before, explains the relation between increased economic
turbulence and unemployment through the matching process of jobs and workers. In
their model economic turbulence is modeled  as a permanent shock that increases the
relative value of the right match. In times of economic turbulence generous benefits
allow workers to search longer for better matches, which increases the equilibrium
unemployment rate. Mismatch is decreased at the expense of an inefficient level of
investment in search.
Changing social and demographic patterns also influence the long run impact of social
security programs. Individualization  and an increased number of divorced couples
puts more pressure on non-contribution programs such as family allowance and social
assistance. In the United Kingdom policy makers in 1948 considered social assistance
a temporary provision, as they expected that eventually everyone would be self-
supporting through work or (unemployment) insurance (Barr (1998),  p. 242). A social
security system where benefit entitlements are highly dependent on labor market
status, such as the German system, has difficulties to cope with these changing social
patterns outside the labor market. Structural changes in the employment pattern of
workers, such as the sharp rise in the share of part-time workers in The Netherlands,
also put pressure on the existing social security programs. Part-time workers and
workers with intermitted incomes are often excluded from insurance based benefits,
mostly unemployment and occupational disability benefits.
Substitution between unemployment insurance and disability schemes
‘A major problem of the rather generous design of the social security system in The
Netherlands is that the number of disability beneficiaries has exploded since the
1970s. The number of benefits now surmounts 900,000 which is far beyond
expectations when the disability act unanimously passed Parliament in 1967. It is
widely recognized  that many of these workers are in fact unemployed. Aarts and De
Jong (1992) conclude in their study for The Netherlands that up to 50 percent of the
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workers receiving a disability benefit, are in fact unemployed. This is an important
issue for two reasons. First, because disability benefits are more generous than
unemployment benefits, and a high share of disabled workers therefore rises wage
costs and increases the government’s budget deficit. The second reason is that if
employment outflow is skewed towards disability benefits, the unemployment level is
lowered artificially. This generates biased and unintended labor market signals, which
could cause economically unsound wage increases. Yet, for obvious political reasons
it appears extremely difficult to curb this “curse of a good act”, as it is labelled by
former Dutch prime minister Lubbers, and turn the disablity benefit provision into a
benefit provision of last resort it was intended to be.
This problem is not unique to The Netherlands. In a study of the inflow into the
German disability scheme, Riphahn  (1997) finds that a lower replacement ratio has a
negative impact on the inflow rate. Because the effect is quite small and is his study
there was no significant effect of aggregate unemployment on disability inflow,
Riphahn  concludes that there is probably no substitution between unemployment and
disability. However, Bowitz (1997) addresses the same issue for Norway and he finds
a significant positive influence of the aggregate unemployment rate on disability
inflow. It seems likely that in some of the European countries there is inefficient
substitution between unemployment and disability schemes.
A related issue is the risk of interaction between different social security schemes if
there are large differences in benefit levels. The levels of certain benefits, notably
unemployment and early retirement benefits, are likely to have a positive influence on
the inflow rate into disability. A worker who applies for disability benefits will always
have to take a medical examination, facing the possibility that he will not be granted a
benefit. In that case, he can apply for another benefit. If these benefit levels are
relatively high, this reduces the financial risk of applying for disability benefits, which
will have a positive impact on the number of workers applying for disability benefits
and hence, given the acceptance probability, the disability inflow rate will increase
(Bowitz (1997)).
5. Conclusions
Our survey of the theoretical literature on institutional aspects of social security
schemes and the review of practical experiences in the European countries with these
institutions taught us the following lessons for setting up social security systems in
newly developing countries.
1 . There is no need for developing countries to follow the same historical pattern
of development of social security systems as European countries did. Ahmad
(1991) states that the three stages in the development of European social
security systems are misleading if used as a guide to policy. The history of
European welfare states, although not discussed extensively in this paper,
learns that the development of social security systems is not a linear process
and that the direction of the developments, for example towards insurance-
dominated systems or redistribution-dominated systems, depends on may
political, economic and social circumstances. The lesson for newly developing
economies is that there is no such thing as a ‘natural next step’ in the
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development of formal social security programs. This applies also for the
development of the two social security concepts that can be distinguished in
Europe: there is no need for other countries to develop similar systems.
2 . Social security systems should be tailor made and be adapted to the specific
social structure and properties of the labor market in the country. There exists
no uniform blueprint for an optimal system of social security.
3 . Social security systems may combine both elements of the insurance concept
and of the redistribution concept. To some extent the system will always have
to be based on solidarity, especially with respect to the poor who should be
provided an income guarantee above subsistence level. On the other hand, the
system should contain enough incentives to avoid moral hazard and free rider
behavior. It is essential that incentives in the system do encourage, and not
discourage, labor participation.
4 . The redistribution inherent in social security systems is bound to diminish
income inequality to a certain extent. Because of the trade-off between equity
and efficiency this may hamper economic growth. On the other hand, social
security, due to its irrigation function, can also foster economic growth as it
provides unemployed the opportunity to search for good and productive job
matches. Hence the design of a social security system should find a good
balance between this negative equity-efficiency trade-off and the irrigation
function of social security.
5 . A major lesson to be drawn from the experience in European countries and
especially in The Netherlands is that the initial design of the social security
system should not be too generous and too much directed towards to
provisions of benefits. In these early days of social security the use of the
system was much underestimated. The mere availability of the provisions
evoked a supply effect which was strengthened by the negative wedge spiral:
the entitlement of an individual for a social security benefit brings about a
negative externality for the employed as they have to pay higher social
security premiums. Newly developing countries should avoid the mistake of
setting up too generous and passive systems: the system should provide a
trampoline instead of a hammock.
.
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